


# Web Shell Case Study

---


Lindsey Lack  
John Conwell

Applied Threat Research  
Gigamon Threat Insight




- + Motivation
- + Web Shell 101
- + Setup
- + Case Study with tips and guidelines





---

# Objective



# Webshell 101



---

# Setup

## Assumptions

---

- Enterprise volume network data
  - At least North-South being captured
- Zeek-style metadata being generated and available

## Problem Scoping


---

- Limit to external sources and internal servers
- Limit to HTTP
- Limit to web shell hosted by new file

---

# Threat Emulation

- Started with 8 manufactured web shell episodes
  - Behinder, ASPXSpy, Godzilla, antsword, etc
  - Create PCAPs from lab environment
  - Extract Zeek metadata






# Hiding the Needle

Effectively weaving sample data into real network traffic

## Emulated traffic



## Background traffic





# Finding the Object

Issues with host and destination IP field pairs



192.168.38.106	192.168.38.106
----------------	----------------

null	192.168.38.106
------	----------------

realsite.com	10.2.0.24
--------------	-----------


realsite.com	10.2.0.26
--------------	-----------

realsite.com	10.2.0.24
--------------	-----------

realsite2.com	10.2.0.24
---------------	-----------

# Finding the Object

Issues with host and destination IP field pairs



 = connected components

# Finding the Object


Issues with multiple user agents



Opera/9.80 (X11; Linux...	192.168.38.104	/behinder.php	192.168.38.106	192.168.38.106
Mozilla/5.0 (iPad; CPU...	192.168.38.104	/behinder.php	192.168.38.106	192.168.38.106
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh...	192.168.38.104	/behinder.php	192.168.38.106	192.168.38.106
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT...	192.168.38.104	/behinder.php	192.168.38.106	192.168.38.106

# Finding the Object

Final algorithm




 = connected components




# Finding the Object

Final algorithm example



# Finding the Object

Final algorithm



 = connected components



---

## Dealing with Noise

- Specific noise for your environment
  - Possible example: Requests from internal addresses, but they look external since they go through a proxy
- Heuristic / Pattern
  - Scanner patterns: consistent User-Agent, source IP, uri\_path with many destination IPs and failed connections
- Signature
  - Detection of bot user agents via regex list
    - E.g.: Pinterestbot, Baiduspider, YandexBot, MoodleBot

### Tip:

Signature-based approaches to feature generation work better for **noise** than **signal**

**Attackers** may try to adapt to avoid detection, but **noise sources** don't care



---

# Hard Cuts

- Expert decision
  - Wrong decision can result in FP
- When trying to reduce false positives, having a smaller set of items to start with helps
  - Reduces data set imbalance
- Can make hard cuts soft again

One webshell used the hard-coded User-Agent of:  
**Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)**





# Feature Finding Strategy

Iterative, not Comprehensive


## Strategy 1

- Think of all possible features
- Optimize model

## Strategy 2


- Think of a few features, apply hard cuts
- Evaluate remaining subsets to identify additional features
- Repeat

*Recommended*



# Threat Emulation

- Started with 8 manufactured web shell episodes
  - Behinder, ASPXSpy, Godzilla, antsword, etc
- Early model was too effective
  - Recognized that one of the key features corresponded with the process used to generate examples
- Ultimately generated 18 episodes
  - Increased variability of attacker behavior in additional episodes
  - Made problem more difficult




---


# Modeling

Strong features

Malicious




Background



# Modeling

Finding a suitable model





# Modeling


Using multiple models

## + High performing

- ▶ Ensemble of Support Vector Machine (with optimized parameters) and AdaBoosted trees
- ▶ Effective for generalized detection with low FP rate

## + Explainable



- ▶ ExplainableBoostingClassifier
- ▶ Increased chance of FPs, but useful for hunting and provides context
- ▶ Specifically select features for:
  - ▶ Independence (lack of correlation)
  - ▶ Understandability
  - ▶ Value to model



Summarized reasons for prediction  
(Negative sample, negative prediction)

# Meta Validation

- Embedded validation into process, not just model creation



---

## 10 secrets for creating a crazy good network detection model

(Do these and you'll put Suricata signature writers out of a job)

- Overlay emulated malicious traffic over real traffic
- Use high-level protocol information (Zeek)
- Focus detection scope
- Maintain feedback loop between emulation and modeling
- Carefully define object of focus
- Remove noise (with signatures if needed)
- Make hard cuts (prudently)
- Be the decision tree (to find features)
- Explain your work
- Validate outside the process



---

# Questions

The background is a solid orange color with a complex, abstract pattern of wavy lines and dots. The pattern consists of multiple layers of thin, parallel lines that create a sense of depth and movement, resembling a digital or data visualization. The dots are small and scattered throughout the pattern, adding to the textured appearance.