



# Campaign Detection

Automatic Cyber-attack campaign detection  
using network traffic data

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# Campaign Detection

## Why do we care?

Cyber-attacks on the internet don't occur in a vacuum. Events are related. Only seeing one (or a few) parts can lead to incomplete or incorrect assumptions. Providing analysts with an automated way to assess which occurrences are related to each other can help improve both speed and quality of cybersecurity work.

There are lots of things on the internet, and trying to detect campaigns by hand is infeasible. Automation of campaign detection is a possible solution.

# Presentation summary

## What

Detect campaigns by determining whether pairs of log lines are from the same attack

Aggregate over those pairs to discover the whole campaign

## How

Use generated data to determine expectations

Use project-specific data to test algorithm viability

## Results

Generated data: can achieve F1 scores of 0.75-0.95, depending on data used

With project data, can determine cutoff score to identify incident reports belonging to same attack

# Background work

## Challenges to think about

# A Naive Approach

Measuring distance between sets (modified Jaccard distance)


A: set of entities from one attack

B: set of entities from another attack

Measure overlap:  $1 - \frac{|A \cap B|}{\min(|A|, |B|)}$

Cutoff of 0.5-0.6 could indicate same campaign

Problem: not enough data to prove or test rigorously



# Challenges

Usual challenges for machine learning with cyber data apply:

1. Variability of data, format and content
2. Limited labeled data
3. Volume of data

# Algorithm design

# Algorithm Design

Design is relatively simple

- Divide data into manageable log lines
- Pair log lines randomly
- Label pairs as from 'same' or 'different' attacks
- String vectorization and AutoKeras' Automodel

Addresses problem #1 (variability of data)

String vectorization allows for multiple data formats to be used simultaneously



# Testing Strategy

## Step 1: will this work?

- Start with generated data
- Can make data with whatever labels and attacks are desired

Addresses problem #2 (lack of labeled data)

Generated data allows creation of exactly the format and type desired

## Step 2: project specific data

- Run as second pass after threat detectors identify traffic of interest
- However, the more limited data makes testing more difficult

Addresses problem #3 (data volume), but reintroduces #2

# Step 1: Generated data

Controlling training data to assess viability

# Generating data

Use MagicWand<sup>1</sup> - open source tool that generates high quality reproducible DDoS data from a variety of attacks

Generate data from each of 7 available attacks

Remove features that are indicative of generation differences (IP addresses, timestamps)

	Src Port	Dst Port	Protocol	Flow Duration	Total Fwd Packet	Total Bwd packets	...	Fwd Seg Size Min	Active Mean	Active Std	Active Max	Active Min	Idle Mean	Idle Std	Idle Max	Idle Min	Label
0	41374	80	6	65221938	7	0	...	40	7.109719e+06	0.000000e+00	7109719.0	7109719.0	4.030916e+14	8.061832e+14	1.612366e+15	8.192030e+06	slowloris
1	40492	80	6	64069913	7	0	...	40	7.237728e+06	0.000000e+00	7237728.0	7237728.0	4.030916e+14	8.061832e+14	1.612366e+15	8.192049e+06	slowloris
2	46474	80	6	64898806	7	0	...	40	7.298477e+06	0.000000e+00	7298477.0	7298477.0	4.030916e+14	8.061832e+14	1.612366e+15	8.195915e+06	slowloris
3	58718	80	6	64066782	7	0	...	40	7.231574e+06	0.000000e+00	7231574.0	7231574.0	4.030916e+14	8.061832e+14	1.612366e+15	8.196003e+06	slowloris
4	40068	80	6	109574020	21	4	...	32	5.607711e+06	5.033170e+06	9733685.0	2.0	2.687278e+14	6.582460e+14	1.612367e+15	6.656038e+06	slowread
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

<sup>1</sup> <https://joss.theoj.org/papers/10.21105/joss.03032>

# Using the data

Randomly pair logs

- Some pruning required to prevent more prolific attacks from dominating

Label pairs as 'same' or 'different'

- Not an attack classification problem
- Regardless of which attack, only concerned with equivalence of pairs

Train model using AutoKeras to predict whether pairs are from same or different attack

Test on holdout dataset

# The Model

Layer (type)	Output Shape
input_1 (InputLayer)	[(None, 1)]
text_vectorization (TextVect	(None, 64)
embedding (Embedding)	(None, 64, 128)
dropout (Dropout)	(None, 64, 128)
conv1d (Conv1D)	(None, 58, 32)
conv1d_1 (Conv1D)	(None, 52, 32)
max_pooling1d (MaxPooling1D)	(None, 8, 32)
conv1d_2 (Conv1D)	(None, 8, 32)
conv1d_3 (Conv1D)	(None, 8, 32)
max_pooling1d_1 (MaxPooling1	(None, 2, 32)
flatten (Flatten)	(None, 64)
dense (Dense)	(None, 32)
re_lu (ReLU)	(None, 32)
dense_1 (Dense)	(None, 32)
re_lu_1 (ReLU)	(None, 32)
normalization (Normalization	(None, 32)
dense_2 (Dense)	(None, 1)
classification_head_1 (Activ	(None, 1)

# Results

With appropriate training parameters, results are promising

Training requirements vary based on data


Need significantly longer time to distinguish between more types of attacks, more similar attacks (unsurprising)

Fig 1: Train for 2 trails, 8 epochs, vary number of attacks included in training/test set


Fig 2: Vary number of epochs.

- group A: 2 attack types
- group B: 4 attack types

Performance vs # attacks



Performance vs Training Time



# Caveat

## **This is not a first pass algorithm**

Computationally impossible to pair and test all internet traffic

Birthday problem: testing all pairs is way more comparisons than you think

## **Feasible as a second pass**

Project data is already filtered through threat detection analytics

Pairing and testing the more limited data set is possible (100-200 incident reports per day)

# Step 2: Project-specific data

Applying previous lessons to intended data



# Project-specific incident reports

Automatically generated by project performers' threat detectors, but not yet checked by human analysts

Data presented in STIX format - standard format for describing cyber traffic

- IP addresses
- TTPs
- Timestamps
- Relationships between users

Not full-on log lines; just data intended for presentation to analyst

Less rich/dense than ZEEK logs

# Training the Algorithm

Select incident reports generated from red-team event, and comparable non-red-team reports

Parse STIX into log lines (or log line equivalents)

Randomly pair up log lines, label appropriately (holding back test set)

Run through string vectorization and AutoModel

Resulting model has same layers as generated data model

# Running the Algorithm

Pick two incident reports

Parse STIX

Randomly pair up log lines

Run algorithm on each pair, get scores (probability pair is from same attack)

Aggregate (average) scores to determine whether incident reports are related


# Results

**Results are promising!**

Average score for test incident reports: 0.81

Average score for unrelated incident reports: 0.41

Pairing results



# What's next?

Further work

# Future Work

Expecting another round of project-specific data soon

- Will provide another campaign, expanding training data
- New data may cause different parameters to perform better
- May also reveal different data parsing results in better performance

Expanding to threat detectors/incident reports from other sources

- Will require complete retraining, with inclusion of other source formats
- Allow integration between multiple analyst tools

# Conclusion

Campaign detection, via pairing log-line equivalents, is not viable as a first pass strategy on all internet traffic. However, as a second pass on data already identified by threat detectors, it shows promise at distinguishing whether two incident reports belong to the same cyber event.

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