

```
wget https://data.hpc.imperial.ac.uk/resolve/?doi=9422&file=4&access=-0 full_BETH_dataset.zip
```



Kaggle Dataset



Workshop Paper

&

<https://www.camlis.org/2021/schedule>

# BETH Dataset

## Real Cybersecurity Data for Anomaly Detection Research

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# TL;DR

- New cybersecurity dataset for anomaly detection benchmarking
  - Over 8 million data points
  - Modern host activity and attacks (in the Cloud!)
  - Fully labelled (by hand)
  - Each host contains benign activity and at most a single attack
    - Constrained vulnerability during data collection for accessibility and control over noise
    - Ideal for behavioral analysis and other research tasks
  - Further data is currently being collected
- Benchmarking conducted using:
  - **Robust Covariance** [Rousseuw, 1984]
  - **One-Class SVM** [Schölkopf et al., 2001]
  - **Isolation Forest** [Liu et al., 2008]
  - **VAE** [Kingma & Welling, 2013] + **DoSE-SVM** [Morningstar, et al. 2021]

# The Problem

# Unsupervised Anomaly Detection

## Defining the problem

### GOAL

Identify the unexpected within the data

### RULES

Unsupervised, ideally labels available for verification

### RESULTS

Anomaly?  
Outlier?  
Changing Distribution?

# Unsupervised Anomaly Detection

## Defining the problem

### GOAL

Identify the unexpected within the data

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Unsupervised, ideally labels available for verification


### RESULTS

Anomaly?  
Outlier?  
Changing Distribution?

**Robust Systems**


# Machine Learning Datasets

## For Unsupervised Anomaly Detection



# Machine Learning Datasets

## For Unsupervised Anomaly Detection



# Machine Learning Datasets

## For (Unsupervised) Anomaly Detection

MNIST

EMNIST

FashionMNIST

CIFAR10

SVHN (Digits in Natural Images)

CelebA

ImageNet

STL-10

Reuters

20newsgroup




Figure 1: Our IMAGENET-C dataset consists of 15 types of algorithmically generated corruptions from noise, blur, weather, and digital categories. Each type of corruption has five levels of severity, resulting in 75 distinct corruptions. See different severity levels in Appendix B.

Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019



# Machine Learning Datasets

For (Unsupervised) Anomaly Detection *in cyber security*

MNIST

EMNIST

FashionMNIST

CIFAR10

SVHN (Digits in Natural Images)

CelebA

ImageNet

STL-10

Reuters

20newsgroup

DARPA 1998/1999


KDD 1999

NSL-KDD (2009)

ISCX IDS 2012

# Machine Learning Datasets

Ideal for ML experts while relevant for cyber security



# Machine Learning Datasets

*for cyber security*

	Size	Includes Kernel Traffic	Real Live Traffic	Limited User Activity	Simple Network Environment	Cloud
DARPA 1998/1999	Not Stated	○	×	×	×	×
KDD 1999	7+ million records	×	×	×	×	×
NSL-KDD (2009)	~2 million records	×	×	×	×	×
ISCX IDS 2012	~2 million and ~81.1G of pcaps	×	×	×	×	×

**We need new data.**

# What is a Honeypot?

A pleasant looking trap for unpleasant people



# What is a Honeytrap?

A pleasant looking trap for unpleasant people



# BETH

## BPF-Extended Tracking Honeyypot



# BETH

## BPF-Extended Tracking Honeyypot

To be continued...





# Honeypot Tracking

Tracking inside and out



Kernel-level  
Process Calls



Network Activity

# Honeypot Tracking


## Single instances in the Cloud



# The Data

# Machine Learning Datasets

Ideal for ML experts while relevant for cyber security



# Machine Learning Datasets

## For Anomaly Detection *for cyber security*

	Size	Includes Kernel Traffic	Real Live Traffic	Limited User Activity	Simple Network Environment	Cloud
DARPA 1998/1999	Not Stated	○	×	×	×	×
KDD 1999	7+ million records	×	×	×	×	×
NSL-KDD (2009)	~2 million records	×	×	×	×	×
ISCX IDS 2012	~2 million and ~81.1G of pcaps	×	×	×	×	×
BETH	8+ million records*	○	○	○	○	○

\*We are currently recording more data from our honeypots and will add them to the dataset for public use

# BETH Dataset

Logs from the BETH, kernel and network... but mostly kernel

FEATURE	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
TIMESTAMP	FLOAT	SECONDS SINCE SYSTEM BOOT
PROCESSID*	INT	INTEGER LABEL FOR THE PROCESS SPAWNING THIS LOG
THREADID	INT	INTEGER LABEL FOR THE THREAD SPAWNING THIS LOG
PARENTPROCESSID*	INT	PARENT'S INTEGER LABEL FOR THE PROCESS SPAWNING THIS LOG
USERID*	INT	LOGIN INTEGER ID OF USER SPAWNING THIS LOG
MOUNTNAMESPACE*	INT (LONG)	SET MOUNTING RESTRICTIONS THIS PROCESS LOG WORKS WITHIN
PROCESSNAME	STRING	STRING COMMAND EXECUTED
HOSTNAME	STRING	NAME OF HOST SERVER
EVENTID*	INT	ID FOR THE EVENT GENERATING THIS LOG
EVENTNAME	STRING	NAME OF THE EVENT GENERATING THIS LOG
ARGSNUM*	INT	LENGTH OF ARGS
RETURNVALUE*	INT	VALUE RETURNED FROM THIS EVENT LOG (USUALLY 0)
STACKADDRESSES	LIST OF INT	MEMORY VALUES RELEVANT TO THE PROCESS
ARGS	LIST OF DICTIONARIES	LIST OF ARGUMENTS PASSED TO THIS PROCESS
SUS	INT (0 OR 1)	BINARY LABEL AS A SUSPICIOUS EVENT (1 IS SUSPICIOUS, 0 IS NOT)
EVIL	INT (0 OR 1)	BINARY AS A KNOWN MALICIOUS EVENT (0 IS BENIGN, 1 IS NOT)

Benign data = not evil, maybe sus

Malicious data = evil and sus

# BETH Dataset

## DNS (Network) logs



Not all process call logs have corresponding DNS logs...



FEATURE	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
TIMESTAMP	STRING	DATE AND TIME IN THE FORMAT “YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ” FOR WHEN THE PACKET WAS SENT OR RECEIVED
SOURCEIP	STRING	SOURCE IP ADDRESS OF THE PACKET
DESTINATIONIP	STRING	DESTINATION IP ADDRESS OF THE PACKET
DNSQUERY	STRING	THE SENT DNS QUERY (E.G. THE URL SUBMITTED - “GOOGLE.COM”)
DNSANSWER	LIST OF STRINGS	DNS RESPONSE; CAN BE NULL
DNSANSWERTTL	LIST OF STRINGS (INT)	LIST OF INTEGERS SENT AS STRINGS, CAN BE NULL; THE TIME TO LIVE OF THE DNS ANSWER
DNSQUERYNAMES	LIST OF STRINGS	NAME OF THE REQUESTED RESOURCE
DNSQUERYCLASS	LIST OF STRINGS	CLASS CODE FOR THE RESOURCE QUERY
DNSQUERYTYPE	LIST OF STRINGS	TYPE OF RESOURCE RECORD (A, AAAA, MX, TXT, ETC.)
NUMBEROFANSWERS	STRING (INT)	NUMBER OF ANSWER HEADERS IN THE PACKET
DNSOPCODE	STRING (INT)	HEADER INFORMATION REGARDING WHICH OPERATION THIS PACKET WAS SENT (E.G. STANDARD QUERY IS 0)
SENSORID	STRING	SAME AS THE HOSTNAME IN THE PROCESS RECORDS; NAME OF HOST SERVER
SUS	INT (0 OR 1)	BINARY LABEL AS A SUSPICIOUS EVENT (1 IS SUSPICIOUS, 0 IS NOT)
EVIL	INT (0 OR 1)	BINARY AS A KNOWN MALICIOUS EVENT (0 IS BENIGN, 1 IS NOT)

# Benchmarks



# BETH Dataset Statistics


Training, Validation, and Testing Benchmarks

Total Dataset

8+ million events


# BETH Dataset Statistics

## Training, Validation, and Testing Benchmarks




# BETH Dataset Statistics

## Training, Validation, and Testing Benchmarks



# BETH Dataset Statistics

## Training, Validation, and Testing Benchmarks



DATASET	SUS=0, EVIL=0	SUS=1, EVIL=0	SUS=1, EVIL=1
TRAINING	761875 (99.8%)	1269 (0.02%)	0 (0.00%)
VALIDATION	188181 (99.6%)	786 (0.04%)	0 (0.00%)
TESTING	17508 (9.27%)	13027 (6.89%)	158432 (83.84%)

# Benchmarks

## Unsupervised Anomaly Detection Methods

Robust Covariance

One-Class SVM

Isolation Forest

VAE + DoSE (SVM)

# Benchmarks

## Unsupervised Anomaly Detection Methods

Robust Covariance

One-Class SVM

Isolation Forest

VAE + DoSE (SVM)

METHOD	AUROC
ROBUST COVARIANCE	0.519
ONE-CLASS SVM	0.605
<b>IFOREST</b>	<b>0.850</b>
VAE + DOSE (SVM)	0.698

# Future Work

For **me** and **you!**

More data!

Full PCAPS!

Profile attacker/malware's behavior

Benchmark more unsupervised anomaly detection methods

Fingerprint Analysis

Time series analysis of execution sequences to profile process names

Graph analysis of process relationships to find malicious cliques?

# References

## Datasets

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# References

## Benchmarks

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```
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
 UNIVERSITY OF  
MARYLAND

 Loughborough  
University





# Appendix


# Timeline



# Timeline







# BETH Dataset

## Logs from the BETH, kernel and network... but mostly kernel

```
timestamp,processId,parentProcessId,userId,processName,hostName,eventId,eventName,argsNum,returnValue,args,sus,evil
126.233491,1,0,0,systemd,ip-10-100-1-105,1005,security_file_open,4,0,"[{'name': 'pathname', 'type': 'const char*',
'value': '/proc/384/cgroup'}, {'name': 'flags', 'type': 'unsigned long', 'value': '0_RDONLY|0_LARGEFILE'}, {'name':
'dev', 'type': 'dev_t', 'value': 5}, {'name': 'inode', 'type': 'unsigned long', 'value': 39481}]",0,0
126.233165,384,1,101,systemd-resolve,ip-10-100-1-105,41,socket,3,15,"[{'name': 'domain', 'type': 'int', 'value':
'AF_UNIX'}, {'name': 'type', 'type': 'int', 'value': 'SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC'}, {'name': 'protocol', 'type':
'int', 'value': 0}]",0,0
126.233559,1,0,0,systemd,ip-10-100-1-105,5,fstat,2,0,"[{'name': 'fd', 'type': 'int', 'value': 18}, {'name':
'statbuf', 'type': 'struct stat*', 'value': '0x7FFF1D8D98F0'}]",0,0
126.233681,1,0,0,systemd,ip-10-100-1-105,3,close,1,0,"[{'name': 'fd', 'type': 'int', 'value': 18}]",0,0
126.233796,384,1,101,systemd-resolve,ip-10-100-1-105,3,close,1,0,"[{'name': 'fd', 'type': 'int', 'value': 15}]",0,0
126.23353,1,0,0,systemd,ip-10-100-1-105,257,openat,4,18,"[{'name': 'dirfd', 'type': 'int', 'value': -100}, {'name':
'pathname', 'type': 'const char*', 'value': '/proc/384/cgroup'}, {'name': 'flags', 'type': 'unsigned long',
'value': '0_RDONLY|0_CLOEXEC'}, {'name': 'mode', 'type': 'int*', 'value': 1223040804}]",0,0
126.23389,384,1,101,systemd-resolve,ip-10-100-1-105,1005,security_file_open,4,0,"[{'name': 'pathname', 'type':
'const char*', 'value': '/run/systemd/netif/links/5'}, {'name': 'flags', 'type': 'unsigned long', 'value':
'0_RDONLY|0_LARGEFILE'}, {'name': 'dev', 'type': 'dev_t', 'value': 25}, {'name': 'inode', 'type': 'unsigned long',
'value': 527}]",0,0
126.233959,384,1,101,systemd-resolve,ip-10-100-1-105,257,openat,4,15,"[{'name': 'dirfd', 'type': 'int', 'value':
-100}, {'name': 'pathname', 'type': 'const char*', 'value': '/run/systemd/netif/links/5'}, {'name': 'flags',
'type': 'unsigned long', 'value': '0_RDONLY|0_CLOEXEC'}, {'name': 'mode', 'type': 'int*', 'value': 964865707}]",0,0
126.233996,384,1,101,systemd-resolve,ip-10-100-1-105,5,fstat,2,0,"[{'name': 'fd', 'type': 'int', 'value': 15},
{'name': 'statbuf', 'type': 'struct stat*', 'value': '0x7FFFB77D84D0'}]",0,0
```



# BETH Dataset

## DNS (Network) logs

```
Timestamp,SourceIP,DestinationIP,DnsQuery,DnsAnswer,DnsAnswerTTL,DnsQueryNames,DnsQueryClass,DnsQueryType,NumberOfAnswers,DnsResponseCode,DnsOpCode,SensorId,sus,evil
2021-05-16T17:13:14Z,10.100.1.95,10.100.0.2,ssm.us-east-2.amazonaws.com,, ,ssm.us-east-2.amazonaws.com,['IN'],['A'],0,0,0,ip-10-100-1-95,0,0
2021-05-16T17:13:14Z,10.100.0.2,10.100.1.95,ssm.us-east-2.amazonaws.com,['52.95.19.240'],['17'],ssm.us-east-2.amazonaws.com,['IN'],['A'],1,0,0,ip-10-100-1-95,0,0
2021-05-16T21:38:54Z,10.100.0.2,10.100.1.95,download.docker.com,['99.86.61.59','99.86.61.79','99.86.61.24','99.86.61.58'],'['267','45','45','45','45']',download.docker.com,['IN'],['A'],5,0,0,ip-10-100-1-95,1,0
2021-05-16T21:02:51Z,10.100.0.2,10.100.1.4,motd.ubuntu.com,['2a05:d018:91c:3200:2846:99fb:81b6:1e11','2a05:d018:91c:3200:c887:2f22:290f:a7c'],'['210','210']',motd.ubuntu.com,['IN'],['AAAA'],2,0,0,ip-10-100-1-4,0,0
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2021-05-16T21:38:54Z,10.100.1.95,10.100.0.2,security.ubuntu.com,, ,security.ubuntu.com,['IN'],['A'],0,0,0,ip-10-100-1-95,0,0
```